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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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Communist China: Peking apparently has completed its long, drawn-out reorganization in the west China province of Szechwan; additional shake-ups in other provinces may soon be announced.

According to a usually reliable Red Guard newspaper distributed in Peking, the central committee issued a directive on 7 May dismissing Li Ching-chuan, first secretary of the Southwest party bureau and political commissar of the Chengtu (Szechwan) Military Region (CMR). CMR commander Huang Hsin-ting also was dismissed. Both have been in disgrace and apparently powerless for months. Li Ching-chuan, a politburo member, came under strong poster attack last fall. He was publicly denounced by Madame Mao on 18 December and is reported to have been paraded by Red Guards in Chengtu in January.

According to Red Guard posters, Chengtu was the scene of bloody conflicts between troops and Red Guards just before the reorganization of 7 May. The fact that the central committee quickly charged that the alleged conflicts were instigated by Li and the CMR commander, both of whom already were in disrepute, suggests that the accounts were either fabricated or greatly exaggerated for political purposes. A CMR deputy commander who was making public appearances as recently as March has been denounced in recent Red Guard posters, suggesting that he has fallen along with his superior. This virtually completes the purge of the CMR, which was started in December or January.

Chang Kuo-hua, long the top party and military official in Tibet, is reported to have been named CMR political commissar to replace Li Ching-chuan. Chang's announced task will be to pave the way for a revolutionary committee similar to ones already established in four provinces and in the cities of Shanghai and Peking. The choice of Chang was unexpected, since he had been under heavy attack in his own jurisdiction by Red Guards believed to be responsive to Mao and Lin Piao.

(continued)

The new CMR commander is reported to be Liang Hsing-chu, a political commissar transferred to Chengtu from the Canton Military Region in March or April. Poster reports indicate that Liang and another senior military officer brought in from outside Chengtu have been running the CMR in recent weeks. They apparently were assigned there to rebuild the command structure.

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Sudan: New efforts are under way in Khartoum to oust moderate pro-Western Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi.

The present shaky coalition between Sadiq's Islamic-oriented Umma Party and the urban-based National Union Party (NUP) was established two years ago after a civilian coup displaced a five-year-old military regime. Sadiq's political dexterity, coupled with a general Sudanese reluctance to provoke an actual confrontation, has held the transitional government together despite a continuing series of political crises.

The present moves to displace Sadiq have been spurred by the approaching expiration of the transitional cabinet's mandate on 9 June. Political groups within both the Umma and the NUP are trying to displace Sadiq, who hopes to head a broadly based interim government until a permanent constitution can be promulgated and general elections held. The NUP, however, advocates the appointment of a "neutralist" prime minister to lead the country during the interim period, and Sadiq's opposition may introduce a no-confidence motion in the assembly sometime in the next few weeks.

Sadiq may be forced to rely on the uncertain support of various minority blocs in the assembly, including representatives from the Sudan's three southern and predominantly Negroid provinces, to win such a vote. The prime minister has expressed confidence that such an amorphous alliance will give him the mandate he is seeking, but the southerners may bargain for increased political power before promising their support.

No other Sudanese leader possesses Sadiq's individual influence and prestige, but the present ganging up on the part of Umma and NUP forces might be able to displace him. Should he lose a no-confidence vote, Sadiq will probably concentrate on campaigning for the office of president under the new constitutional system.


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Iraq: President Arif has assumed the prime ministership in a cabinet shift which probably signifies a drift toward moderation in policies toward the West and neutrality in inter-Arab affairs. Cairo will probably interpret the changes as a move against Nasir. The four new deputy prime ministers are generally regarded as forceful men who may put new life into efforts to end the country's economic stagnation. Foreign Minister Pachachi, a moderate well versed in oil matters, retains his post.

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